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Abstract
Due to the financial crisis of 2007, regulatory authorities engaged in a fundamental
reconsideration of how they approach financial regulation and supervision. Therefore,
that financial crisis caused the need of a significant change of the regulations of remu-
neration in the financial sector in the EU. It is worth to notice that the EU led the way
internationally as the EU’ s approach has exerted externally. The European Securities
and Markets Authority published guidelines on the managers’ remuneration policies of
investment funds. The guidelines introduced new standards for investment managers.
In this thesis, we study the managerial behaviour due to changes to incentive schemes.
We consider a manager who is offered an awarded fee by the investor based on a specific
model, which we will subsequently analyse. Moreover, the manager withholds a per-
centage of the earned bonuses in an account for some time period. We study how the
management fee ranges accordingly to how small or big is the amount which is saved
in the account. Finally, we observe that the existence of the account evolves more risk
taking but it gives higher total fees.
Keywords–Regulations, Bellman equation, bonus, dynamic programming, incen-
tives, portfolio choice, value function, manager, account
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Introduction
B
efore we start analysing the aim of this thesis, let us mention that the
last years new stricter regulations on financial sector remuneration have been
introduced. According to the Financial Stability Board (FSB) [1]:
Compensation practices at large financial institutions are one factor among
many that contributed to the financial crisis that began in 2007. High short-
term profits led to generous bonus payments to employees without adequate
regard to the longer-term risks they imposed on their firms. These perverse
incentives amplified the excessive risk-taking that severely threatened the
global financial system and left firms with fewer resources to absorb losses as
risks materialised. The lack of attention to risk also contributed to the large,
in some cases extreme absolute level of compensation in the industry.
Consequently, during 2010 the EU passed legislation imposing new restrictions on
financial sector remuneration [2]. The EU Institutions claimed that EU ’s new require-
ments were some of ”the strictest rules in the world on bankers’ bonuses”. Member
States were required to implement the new requirements into their domestic law by 1
January 2011, including applying them to bonuses for 2010. To assist in the application
of the new requirements, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS, but
from 2011 replaced by the European Banking Authority (EBA)), issued guidelines on
remuneration policies and practices.
The new EU remuneration restrictions define the target in terms of the remuneration
incentives in order to limit the financial sector’s desire for high-risk, short term financial
strategies. Since the solution should be compatible with the problem, the success of
regulatory reform of financial sector pay should properly be judged by reference to its
capacity to restrain excessive risk-taking, not wider redistributive goals [3] [4].
This thesis report studies the managerial behaviour, due to changes in incentive
schemes.
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But do managers really attempt to maximize fund value? It is easy to see how
they might be tempted to engage in activities not in the best interest of shareholders.
Their goal is not necessarily to outperform a particular competitor or benchmark, but
to perform well enough to keep and, hopefully, grow their assets under management.
There are a number of ways to overcome this incentive problem, such as managers can
be given salary incentive schemes to get their interests to move toward those of share-
holders. Therefore, variable incentive schemes are an increasingly fundamental part of
total remuneration of managers for investors. In the context of asymmetry of informa-
tion between investors and their managers, we investigate the use of incentive contracts
as strategic variables. Usually investors split their assets between index-managers and
specialists. Specialists are the ones who take on large risks and their remuneration is
often performance based, therefore they seem to be the ones with incentive schemes.
Management fee structures vary from fund to fund as they can manage mutual
funds, private equity, units trust, hedge funds and offshore companies on behalf of
investors/owners. However, they are typically based on a percentage of assets under
management. Most of the times it is a fixed fee and a bonus fee based on the excess
return related to some index to the order of which, fees are proportional.
Our work is motivated by the paper ”On Incentives for Sustainable Investments” [5]
which studies the effect of high water mark based bonus schemes and compares the
different types of those schemes. Specifically, four different managerial remuneration
schemes are considered, one reference setting and three different water mark settings of
different height. Our work aims to study such incentive schemes under the new regula-
tions. We do not examine the effect of high water mark but we add a new regulation
and we consider only one remuneration scheme, the reference setting. Moreover, the the-
sis proposes incentive structures for investments in environmentally friendly assets, i.e.,
sustainable investments. Remuneration schemes for those types of investments mainly
aim to yield higher managerial income if the ”green” (sustainable) asset outperforms the
”black” (conventional) asset. We consider an account where the manager withholds a
proportion of earned bonuses for four time periods and it is managed exactly like the
fund. More analytically, the investor awards the manager a bonus after the end each
time point and the manager saves a percentage of this bonus in an account, keeping
the rest of the bonuses in her ”pocket”. At the end of the terminal point, the manager
empties the account at a discount rate of 1 + δ + δ2. We need to use a discount factor
because it considers not just the time value of money, but also the risk or uncertainty
of future cash flows. The greater the uncertainty of future cash flows, the higher the
discount rate.
However, we do not keep track of when the bonuses were earned. Furthermore, by
changing the percentage of the amount which the manager saves in the account, we
observe how the awarded fee ranges. Also, we compare these results with the result of
the reference scheme where there does not exist any account.
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows:
In Chapter 2, we introduce the model that we use in order to achieve our results,
followed by the theoretical analysis of this model in Chapter 3. Chapter 4, consists of
2
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
the numerical solution, followed by the results that we got in Chapter 5. You find our
conclusions and the presumptive future work that we could continue with in Chapter 6.
3
2
Model
2.1 Fund Value Evolution
In this section we will specify the model that governs the development of the fund value.
Similarly with the paper ”On Incentives for Sustainable Investments” [5], we assume
that the capital to be handled by the manager is initially equal to 1. We also assume
that her mandate runs over the time interval [0,T ]. In our case, we set that the total
time periods are four. As we have already mentioned the manager is expected to allo-
cate capital in two different investments, which may be considered ”green” and ”black”,
respectively. So at discrete time points t, for t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T − 1, the manager allocates
capital according to
λte
Xt+1 + (1− λt)eZt+1 , (2.1)
where eXt+1 represents the green investment and eZt+1 represents the black invest-
ment. The index t+ 1 is used to indicate that the returns on choices made at time t are
not realized until time t + 1. The choice λt is a real number between 0 and 1. At time
t+ 1 while the investor observes the fund value, she offers the manager an awarded fee
which is denoted as Φt+1. The manager deducts this fee from the fund value before she
makes her next choice. Letting f(λt) = λte
Xt+1 + (1 − λt)eZt+1 , the value of the fund
before rewarding the manager, is assumed to be evolving according to
Yt+1 = f(λt)(Yt − Φt), (2.2)
where Φt is the manager’s awarded fee at time t. Hence,
Y˜ = Yt − Φt (2.3)
where Y˜ denotes the fund value after rewarding the manager.
4
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2.2 Remuneration Scheme
At each time point t+ 1 the manager receives a fraction α of the fund value, and if she
performs better than the ”conventional” or the black asset she receives a fraction β of
the percentage of her bonuses that she does not put on the account of the excess return
and also receives that percentage of the fund value of the account value. We also note
that the bonus, i.e., the manager’s extra reward of the excess return, is linear in the
choice λt.
Thus the incentive scheme is given by
Φt+1(λt) = [αf(λt) + θβλt max{eXt+1 − eZt+1 , 0}]Y˜t + f(λt)θAt (2.4)
for the time points t ∈ {0, ..., T − 2}, where:
α and β are fixed prices, 1− θ indicates the percentage of the manager’s bonus that
is put on her account and At is the account value at the time t and is given by:
At = (1− θ)[f(λt)At−1 + βλt max{eXt+1 − eZt+1 , 0}Y˜t],∀t ≥ 2 (2.5)
and
At = f(λt)At−1 + βλt max{eXt+1 − eZt+1 , 0}Y˜t, ∀t ≤ 1 (2.6)
Moreover for t = T − 1 the awarded fee is given by:
ΦT (λT−1) = f(λt)[αY˜t +
1
3
At(1 + δ+ δ
2)] + λtY˜t[θ+ δ
3(1− θ)]βmax{eXt+1 − eZt+1 , 0}Y˜t
(2.7)
where δ is the discount factor.
The discount factor δ is needed because it takes into account not just the time value of
money, but also the risk or uncertainty of future cash flows. The greater the uncertainty
of future cash flows, the higher the discount rate. At this point it is worth to notice that
we do not keep track of the amount that is on the account when the deposits are made.
In order to see if the total fees are affected by the percentage of the bonuses that are
kept in the account, we test the model for different values of this percentage. First, we
consider as case I, the hypothesis that there does not exist any account. In that case,
θ equals to 100%. Afterwards, when θ equals to 50% we meet case II and then case III
is the one when θ is equal to 75%. In the first case where θ = 100%, the manager does
not save any money at the account, fact that means the new regulations are not applied
here. In the second case when θ = 50%, the percentage of the manager’s bonus that is
put on her account is 50%, i.e. she saves the half of her bonuses. Thirdly, while θ = 75%,
the manager keeps 25% of her bonuses on an account.
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Theoretical Analysis
In order to briefly outline the methodology for solving the optimization problems, we
need to use the constant relative risk aversion utility function. The Constant Relative
Risk Aversion utility function [6] is the most straightforward implication of relative risk
aversion that occurs in the context of forming a portfolio with one risky asset and one
risk-free asset, therefore it consists the most appropriate utility function for our aim.
The Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility function is
U(x) =
x
1−γ
1−γ if γ > 0, γ 6= 1,
lnγ if γ = 1.
(3.1)
The parameter γ measures the degree of relative risk aversion that is implicit in the
utility function. Before we continue to the methodology, it is worth to notice that when
total utility is a sum of CRRA functions, the ratios between the consumption of different
goods depend only on relative prices, not on the income level. This means that if there
is an increase in real income level, the consumption of all goods will go up in the same
proportion as income. In other words, all income elasticities are equal to one. In the
section of Appendices we refer more thoroughly to the properties of the function.
We continue by assuming that given the CRRA utility function and letting δ be the
discount factor or time preference, the manager’s aim is to maximize the expected sum
of utilities of her fees. Thus, the latter, similar to Foufas, Sunde´n and Carlsson’s[5], is
given by:
E[
T−1∑
t=0
δt+1U(Φt+1(λt))] =
1
1− γE[
T−1∑
t=0
δt+1Φ1−γt+1 (λt)], (3.2)
with respect to λ0, λ1, ..., λT−1. The maximization will be done using dynamic pro-
gramming methods. We define the value function
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Vt(s) = sup
λt,...,λT−1
1
1− γE[
T−1∑
i=t
δi−t+1Φ1−γt+1 (λi)|St = s], (3.3)
where St is the state of the system at time t and especially it is two-dimensional with
St = (Y˜t, At).
According to the dynamic programming literature, e.g. Stokey, Lucas and Prescott [7],
the results give that the value function Vt satisfies the Bellman equation
Vt(s) = sup
λ
δE[
Φ1−γt (λ)
1− γ + Vt+1(St(λ))|St−1 = s], (3.4)
for t ∈ {1, ..., T}, and where VT+1 = 0 as the manager-investor relation is terminated
at time T .
Moreover, while the state of the system at time T − 1 is indicated as ST−1 we are to
find the optimal choices λˆT−1(s), such that
λˆT−1(s) = argmax
λ
E[
Φ1−γT (λ)
1− γ |ST−1 = s]. (3.5)
as
argmax
x
f(x) := {x|∀y : f(y) ≤ f(x)} (3.6)
The corresponding value function is the right hand side of 3.5 with the argmaxλ
substituted by the supλ.
VT (s) = sup
λ
E[
Φ1−γT (λ)
1− γ |ST−1 = s]. (3.7)
At time points t = T − 2, ..., 0 the problem is to find the numbers λˆt(s) such that
λˆt(s) = argmax
λ
E[
Φ1−γt+1 (λ)
1− γ + Vt+2(St+1(λ))|St = s]. (3.8)
with corresponding value functions given by
Vt+1(s) = sup
λ
E[
Φ1−γt+1 (λ)
1− γ + Vt+2(St+1(λ))|St = s]. (3.9)
Thus, we find the array of optimal choices
{λˆ0, λˆ1(s1), ..., λˆT−1(sT−1)}. (3.10)
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Numerical Solution
To numerically solve the Bellman equations for the optimal choices, a tree of state space
going into each time period is spanned. By using the optimization and interpolation
routines in MATLAB, we compute the fund value function and the optimal choices at
each node of the tree. The optimal choice λˆt−1 is found using the ”fminbound” routine
in MATLAB.
However to numerically solve the Bellman equations for the optimal choices at hand,
the state space is as discretized.
4.1 Case I (θ = 100%)
This is the simplest setting considering that there are no new regulations and the manager
does not put any amount of the bonuses on the account. In mathematical terms, the fee
Φt at time t can be written
Φt+1(λt) = [αf(λt) + βλt max{eXt+1 − eZt+1 , 0}]Y˜t (4.1)
In this point of view we should backdate in equation 2.4 where if we set
Mt = max{eXt+1 − eZt+1 , 0}, (4.2)
for notational convenience, we get
g(λt) = αf(λt) + βλtMt. (4.3)
Then at time t = T − 1 the optimal choice is
λˆT−1(s) = argmax
λ
1
1− γE[(g(λ)Y˜T−1)
1−γ |Y˜T−1 = y] (4.4)
= argmax
λ
y1−γ
1− γE[g
1−γ(λ)] (4.5)
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where y is the fund value instantly after the manager is rewarded the amount ΦT−1.
But g(λ) and Y˜T−1 are independent therefore the optimal choice is independent of the
fund value y. We find the optimal choice λˆT−1 in MATLAB by using the ”fminboud”
routine.
The corresponding value function VT is given by
VT = sup
λ
1
1− γE[(g(λ)Y˜T−1)
1−γ |Y˜T−1 = y] (4.6)
= sup
λ
y1−γ
1− γE[g
1−γ(λ)] (4.7)
as g(λ) and Y˜T−1 are independent.
While the account is empty, we set At = 0, henceforth, the state St becomes Y˜t.
Thus, similarly as previously, by using the equation 3.8 we can obtain that all the
optimal choices are independent of the current fund value. Our numerical procedure
generates a sequence of real numbers λ0, λ1, ..., λT−1.
4.2 Cases II (θ = 50%) and III (θ = 75%)
In these two remaining settings the manager saves an amount of the bonuses on the
account and therefore the state St is equal to (Y˜t, At). With this state and with Φt given
by 2.4 and 2.6, the Bellman equation gives
λt(y,a) = argmax
λ
E[
Φ1−γt+1 (λ)
1− γ + Vt+1(Y˜t(λ), At)|Y˜t = y,At = a] (4.8)
The corresponding value function similarly is
Vt(y,a) = sup
λ
δE[
Φ1−γt+1 (λ)
1− γ + Vt+1(Y˜t(λ), At)|Y˜t = y,At = a] (4.9)
Thus for these two cases, there is no independence between the optimal choices and
the fund value and therefore we get surfaces (and not a sequence of real numbers) of
optimal choices. In all cases the simulation procedure starts from the optimal starting
choice λ0.
4.3 Parameter Choices
The manager is assumed composing a portfolio with higher yield than the point of
reference and also her portfolio is assumed to be more risky than the point of reference.
The green asset also presents higher volatility than the black asset. Moreover, as we
noticed before, the Xt and Zt are Gaussian random variables with correlation parameter
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given by:
Corr(Zt, Xt+h) =
ρ if h = 0,
0 if h 6= 0.
(4.10)
as
Cov(Xt, Xt+h) = 0, h 6= 0 (4.11)
and
Cov(Zt, Zt+h) = 0, h 6= 0 (4.12)
This choice is done for transparency and it is not obligatory to work with this distribution
exclusively.
Below (tables 4.1 and 4.2) we appose the parameters that we chose for the distribution
of the stochastic variables and for the remuneration scheme.
Table 4.1: Parameters for the distribution
Green asset expected return µgr. 0.08
Black asset expected return µbl 0.03
Green asset volatility σgr 0.3
Black asset volatility σbl 0.2
Correlation between two assets ρ 0.7
Table 4.2: Parameters for the remuneration scheme
Fixed fee fraction Bonus fraction Risk aversion Discount factor Interest rate
α β γ δ r
0.02 0.2 2 0.96 0.15
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Results
In this chapter we will see the prices of the optimal starting choices, the graphs of the
remaining three optimal choices and the histograms of the optimal choices from 100000
simulations for each of the cases that we face.
5.1 Case I - Reference Scheme, θ = 100%
Running the optimization for this reference scheme we find the optimal choices as
Table 5.1: Optimal choices
λˆ0 λˆ1 λˆ2 λˆ3
0.690 0.745 0.825 0.962
11
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5.2 Case II, θ = 50%
Below are the optimal choices in Case II where the manager puts the 50% of her bonuses
on the account for four periods. The optimal starting choice is
λˆ0 = 1.0000 (5.1)
The second, the third and the fourth optimal choices as functions of the fund value
and the account value are found in the graphs that follow, Figures (5.1), (5.2) and (5.3)
We should mention that there are some numerical ”glitches” which make the surfaces
non-smooth.
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Figure 5.1: The optimal choice λˆ1 after the first period as a function of the fund value and
the value of the account when θ = 50%
Using the terminology of Hodder and Jackwerth [8], ”Gambler’s ridge” in area A of
figure (5.1) where the fund value is rather low is not surprising in this case. Here manager
is in a situation that could be described as ”heads: I win, tails: I don’t lose very much”.
As we see in this λˆ1 plot for low fund values, the manager optimally becomes risky and
”goes all in” willing to gamble with a very large λ. Even more interesting is the ”Hill of
Anticipation” toward the area B of figure 5.1. This area is a novel area of managerial
behaviour. She has more to lose and more time left to manage the fund than on the
Gambler’s Ridge area, and this moderates her behaviour regarding λ. As the fund value
increases, it is worth more, therefore the bets become higher and the manager keeps
being risky, as we see in area C of the same figure.
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Figure 5.2: The optimal choice λˆ2 after the second period as a function of the fund value
and the value of the account when θ = 50%
In the λˆ2 plot (5.2), we can clearly see that while the account is empty as we can
notice at area A, the manager behaves too risky. As the account value starts increasing
and the fund value is still low, we observe an ”option ridge” in the plot which is seen
at area B. Now the manager has more to lose and more time left to manage the fund
and this moderates her behaviour regarding λ. She decreases the risk-taking and moves
safer. However, above option ridge, the manager’s optimal λ increases consecutively and
also ramps up faster towards an upper ”Merton Flats” region, area C, which exists at
very high fund values.
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Figure 5.3: The optimal choice λˆ3 after the third period as a function of the fund value
and the value of the account when θ = 50%
The λˆ3 plot (5.3) bears similarities with the λˆ2 plot (5.2) as while the account is
empty, area A, the risk is too high, but here we also see lowered risk taking when the
fund value is very low independently of account value, area C. As the fund value reaches
its highest values, area B, the manager continues being risky enough.
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In figure (5.4) we can see the histograms of the optimal choices from 100000 simu-
lations. From left to right, we see λˆ1, λˆ2 and λˆ3. Going chronologically through time
Figure 5.4: The optimal choices from 100000 simulations when θ = 50%
periods, we see that the choices are increasing on average. This means that the manager
optimally takes on more risk as she approaches termination of her contract. We note
that even though the Merton flat is large in figure 5.1, trajectories only end up in one
percent of the runs is whereas the optimal choice in figure 5.4 is one in a 10 percent of
the runs.
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5.3 Case III, θ = 75%
In this section the percentage that the manager saves in the account is about 25% and
the optimal starting choice in this case is
λˆ0 = 1.0000 (5.2)
The remaining optimal choices as functions of the fund value and the account value
can be found in the graphs 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 As we mentioned before, there are some
numerical ”glitches” which make the surfaces non-smooth.
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Figure 5.5: The optimal choice λˆ1 after the first period as a function of the fund value and
the value of the account when θ = 75%
Here the λˆ1 plot (Figure 5.5) bears many similarities with the λˆ1 plot in case II
where the amount that is kept in the account is 50%. (5.1) Again the manager optimally
becomes too risky for low fund values and she ”goes all in” as we can observe at area A.
While the fund value starts increasing and the account value also gets a bit higher, as
we see at area B, the manager decelerates and gets less risky. As we get closer to the
terminal point of this period and the fund value peaks its highest value (area C) the bets
get really high and the manager ”goes all in” again as fund worth more.
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Figure 5.6: The optimal choice λˆ2 after the second period as a function of the fund value
and the value of the account when θ = 75%
In the λˆ2 plot (5.6) the manager behaves in the same way as when θ = 75%. Again
at area A of this plot we notice that for too low account value and low fund value, the
manager takes high risk. As the account value gets a little higher and the fund value
remains low (area B), there is an option ridge in the plot where the manager ”slows
down” and becomes less risky. Afterwards, as being observed at area C while the fund
value reach its highest level, we notice Merton flats in the plot and the that is the time
where the manager ”goes all in” again.
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Figure 5.7: The optimal choice λˆ3 after the third period as a function of the fund value
and the value of the account when θ = 75%
In the λˆ3 plot (5.7) we clearly see many similarities with the λˆ3 plot (5.3). Again the
risk is too high (area A) when there is no money in the account and too low when the
fund value is low (area B). Moreover, as the fund value reaches its highest level (area
C), the risk-taking rockets.
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The histograms of the optimal choices for 100000 runs follow in figure (5.8). From
left to right, we see λˆ1, λˆ2 and λˆ3.
Figure 5.8: The optimal choices from 100000 simulations when θ = 75%
Again in Figure (5.8) we see that the optimal choices are increasing on average and
comparing to the previous case, we note that the optimal choice levels on average are
similarly concentrated in both cases. In addition, similarly with previous case, we note
again that even though the Merton flat in figure 5.5 is large enough, trajectories only
end up in almost one percent of the runs whereas the optimal choice one as we can see
in figure 5.8 in a 10 percent of the runs.
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5.4 Comparison Of Surfaces
5.4.1 θ = 50%
We note that while the fund value is low enough, the risk taking is really high in the
λˆ1 plot as we can see at area A, but it is lowered in the λˆ2 plot (area D) and rather
more lowered in the λˆ3 plot (area C). Also, we can notice that there is an ”option ridge”
present in the plots for λˆ1 (area B) and λˆ2 (area B) but not for λˆ3.
5.4.2 θ = 75%
In this case we note the same similarities and differences in the plots of optimal choices
as in case II. Similarly, the risk taking is getting considerably reduced from λˆ1 plot to
λˆ3 plot while the fund value is rather low. Again, there is an ”option ridge” present in
the plots for λˆ1 (area B) and λˆ2 (area B) but not for λˆ3.
5.5 Comparison of Optimal Choices
In the table (5.2) below we compare the mean of the optimal choices when θ = 50%
and θ = 75% with the optimal choices when θ = 100%. As we can see at the table, the
Table 5.2: Optimal choices
θ = 50% θ = 75% θ = 100%
λˆ0 = 1.000 λˆ0 = 1.000 λˆ0 = 0.690
¯ˆ
λ1 = 0.9467
¯ˆ
λ1 = 0.8946 λˆ1 = 0.745
¯ˆ
λ2 = 0.8886
¯ˆ
λ2 = 0.8530 λˆ2 = 0.825
¯ˆ
λ3 = 0.8878
¯ˆ
λ3 = 0.8906 λˆ3 = 0.962
means of the optimal choices when there exists an account at the time points, 0, 1 and
2 are apparently higher than the corresponding optimal choices when such an account
does not exist. However, it is worth noticing that at the last time point the results are
reversed as the optimal choice while there is not an account is higher than the means of
the optimal choices when there is account. That fact is reasonable as at the end of the
time periods when there are savings, the manager withdraws the money and the account
empties. Overall, we can obtain that the manager takes much more risk when she saves
a percentage of the bonuses in an account.
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5.6 Comparison of Managerial Fees And Investor Returns
in The Different Cases
In this section we try to compare the performance of the manager between the three
different cases while considering the differences in terminal fund values.
Below in figures (5.9), (5.10) and (5.11) we can notice the fixed, bonus and total
fees for each of the cases respectively. Regarding the case where there is no account
Figure 5.9: Fees when θ = 100%
(5.9), we can clearly see that the overall performance of the total fees shows a continued
increase and they reach their highest level of approximately 0.058. On the other hand,
at the cases where there exists an account, things are a bit different. (5.10) and (5.11)
We notice that the total fees begin from a starting point much higher than the fees in
case I and after some fluctuations, they end up to the same value which they started
from. More specifically, when the manager puts half of her bonuses on an account, the
high initial value of total fees is followed by a notable decrease at the third time point.
Then we notice a rapid rise to the same peak as the initial value. In case III where
the manager saves 25% of the bonuses at the account, the total fees behave similarly
with case II. However it is observed a slight difference as we can clearly see that the fees
remain steady between the second and third time points. After this the total fees shoot
up to the highest level of approximately 0.062.
Overall we conclude that the total fees are slightly higher when the manager puts on
the account 25% of her bonuses.
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Figure 5.10: Fees when θ = 50%
Figure 5.11: Fees when θ = 75%
22
5.6. COMPARISON OF MANAGERIAL FEES AND INVESTOR RETURNS IN
THE DIFFERENT CASES CHAPTER 5. RESULTS
Moreover, it is quite of interest to take a look at the fund value from the investor’s
point of view (5.3) As seen in Table 5.3 the spread between upper and lower bounds for
Table 5.3: Mean, 25% and 75%-quantiles for the fund value at termination
Cases θ = 50% θ = 75% θ = 100%
upper bound 1.4385 1.4394 1.4017
mean 1.1574 1.1567 1.1352
lower bound 0.6834 0.6851 0.7146
case I when θ = 100% are narrower than those for the other two cases where there exists
an account. Furthermore, the cases where the manager saves money from the bonuses,
have higher terminal fund value and also case I where there does not exist any account,
gives a lower mean of the terminal value than the other two cases. We see that the
differences between the cases where there exists an account are really small.
Additionally at (5.4) we observe the values of the account at termination. Of course,
we do not consider the case of no new regulations because it is obvious that there is no
money at the account yet.
Table 5.4: Mean, 25% and 75%-quantiles for the account value at termination
Cases θ = 50% θ = 75%
upper bound 0.0686 0.0342
mean 0.0540 0.0268
lower bound 0.0131 0.0066
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6
Conclusions and Future
Directions
6.1 Conclusions
All the tests that we run lead us to the conclusion that those different features in portfolio
managers’ remuneration schemes show some differences in optimal choices between two
risky assets. Especially, we have noted that the introduction of an account with bonus
savings increases risk and also gives more opportunity for the manager and the investor
to maximize their profits.
Looking at simulation results we see that the cases where the manager puts a per-
centage of her bonuses in an account, naturally give choices that are increasing in time
approaching the termination of the contract. Also it is worth to notice that in both
those settings, the choices are similarly concentrated.
Furthermore, by comparing all the surface plots we see that they are all similar to
each other. Thus we obtain the information that if the manager saves a percentage of
her bonuses in an account, it is significant how great is that percentage. We saw that
the differences between θ = 50% and θ = 75% are quite small but we should mention
that the total fees are slightly higher when the manager saves the smallest amount of
the bonuses. Hence, we can obtain that the case III with θ = 75% shows a very small
advantage comparatively to case II. However, it does not matter how big or small will
this percentage be but it surely matters if there exists or not a percentage!
6.2 Future Work
The approach that has been studied in this thesis, can generate new questions for fu-
ture work. It would be really interesting to research these incentive schemes under an
improved version of this regulation.
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In our research, we briefly examine what are the consequences while the manager
puts a percentage of her bonuses in an account and keeps in her ”pocket” the remaining
amount. Nevertheless, we could address another question on that approach. What if
she reinvests the remaining amount of her bonuses with investor’s fund? Addressing
this question will allow us to reconsider the whole model under new regulations. The
manager should be more careful with the investment choices that she would make as she
will be directly affected.
Thus we answer the question that we addressed in the beginning of this report. Do
the managers really attempt to maximize firm/fund value? The answer is yes if they
have such incentives!
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A
Appendices
A.1 Constant Relative Risk Aversion Utility function
As we already noticed in Chapter 3 the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) [9] [10]
utility function is defined as:
U(x) =
x
1−γ
1−γ if γ > 0, γ 6= 1,
lnγ if γ = 1.
(A.1)
where the parameter γ measures the degree of relative risk aversion that is implicit
in the utility function.
We suppose that we have two goods and that
U = u(x1) + u(x2) (A.2)
Since the first derivative of the CRRA utility function is
u′(x) = x−γ , (A.3)
the marginal rate of substitution is
u′(x1)
u′(x2)
=
x−γ1
x−γ2
= (
x2
x1
)γ (A.4)
x2
x1
= (
u′(x1)
u′(x2)
)
1
γ (A.5)
Henceforth, 1γ is the elasticity of the ratio of the consumed quantities of the two
goods with respect to the marginal rate of substitution. By definition σ = 1γ is then
the elasticity of substitution and is a measure of the strength of the substitution effect
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that a change in relative prices urges. This is clearly seen as the first order condition
for the consumer makes the marginal rate of substitution equal to the price ratio [11].
Therefore,
c2
c1
= (
p1
p2
)σ (A.6)
A.2 Bellman Equation
A Bellman equation is a dynamic programming equation which writes the value of a
decision problem at a certain point in time in terms of the payoff from some initial choices
and the value of the remaining decision problem that results from those initial choices.
The solution of this equation is the ”value function” which gives the minimum cost for
a given dynamical system with an associated cost function. For a general optimization
problem, we consider xt a state at time t and x0 the initial state. When action at
represents one or more variables and the current state is represented by T (x,a), the
current payoff is F (x,a). We assume ”impatience” (rate of time preference) is represented
by a discount factor 0 < δ < 1. Under these assumptions, an infinite-horizon decision
problem becomes [12]
V (x0) = max{at}
∞∑
t=0
δtF (xt,at), (A.7)
subject to the constraints at, xt+1 = T (xt,at) Moreover, we should mention that V (x0)
is the value function. Henceforth,
V (x0) = max
a0
{F (x0,a0) + δV (x1)} (A.8)
subject to the constraints a0, x1 = T (x0,a0). Therefore the Bellman equation can be
written as
V (x) = max
a
{F (x,a) + δV (T (x,a))}. (A.9)
In this thesis, the manager chooses a sequence {λt}, t ∈ [0,T ] with state of the system
at time t, St = (Y˜ , At) in such a way that the expected sum of utilities of her fees are
maximized:
max
λt
E[
T−1∑
t=0
δtU(Φ(λt))] (A.10)
as F (xt,at) now is equal to U(Φ(λt)).
The Bellman equation takes a very similar form:
Vt = max
λt
{U(Φ(λt)) + δV (S(λt))} (A.11)
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